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Introduction
On 23 June 2010, China Youth Daily published a long article by JinYongquan accompanied by several photographs and entitled “Howa peasant family was made bankrupt.” (1) In the commentary set-
ting out the details of the “Wu Boliang affair” are the following main points:
From 1993 to 1997, Wu Boliang signed a responsibility contract with
the Sanxi local government to develop some mandarin orange or-
chards. Because the local government did not honour its commit-
ments laid down in the contract, and after a period of negotiation,
Wu Boliang as a party to the responsibility contract, and in the name
of the other signatories, borrowed a sum of money from the local
credit co-operative (xinyongshe信用社) (2) and from private individ-
uals on behalf of the local government in order to cover the wages
of the peasant employees, the cost of necessary construction mate-
rials, and other expenses, totalling 640,000 yuan.
Further down the article states:
As soon as the contract was signed, the local government changed
its position!
And:
Since Wu Boliang’s demands for repayment had no effect, on 14 Jan-
uary 2000, he started proceedings against the Sanxi local government
at the Fuzhou municipal court. This became the first instance in this
mountainous region of a legal action by a “man of the people” (min
民) against “official circles” (guan官), and it caused a sensation.
Wu Boliang, a peasant and for many years the head of his village, is a re-
markable person who was the first from his area to have the temerity, or the
insouciance, to launch a legal claim for the repayment of the cost of his in-
vestment in the orchards belonging to the township, which he had obtained
under a “responsibility” contract chengbao 承包. (3) These proceedings started
in 2000, and Wu Boliang won immediately, but this outcome produced no
result; the sums borrowed were not reimbursed and he was forced to become
a petitioner. The affair dragged on over a long period, reaching its final out-
come in 2014.
This article recounts and analyses the personal experience of a single man
as an example of the social relations involved in local village society. His is
not an isolated case, for there are many examples of “members of the peo-
ple starting proceedings against officials” (min gao guan民告官) in Chinese
newspapers and legal journals in particular. The Chinese database for written
academic records (CNKI) lists 1,796 sources under the key words min gao
guan, of which 171 concern the “difficulty” (nan 难) that people have had
in bringing cases against officials. (4) The example of Wu Boliang illustrates
the social complexity affecting rural society within contemporary Chinese
society. The study offered here takes an anthropological approach to reflect
on the practices and values shaping the actions undertaken by the different
protagonists, and on the sociological relationships influencing each of them,
over and above their personal relations. The aim is not so much to depict
the dysfunctions being described as to understand how the social relation-
ships between the protagonists operate, and the nature of their underlying
ideology as well as their sociological coherence.
The first-hand sources for this article are based on notes compiled in situ
since 2002, during regular research work into the nuo ceremonial theatre
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1. Jin Yongquan, “Yige nongmin jiating shi zenme zoudao pochan bianyuan de” (How a peasant family
was made bankrupt), Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily), 23 June 2010, p. 8. 
2. The main banking organisation for loans to the peasantry. 
3. The “responsibility system,” established as part of China’s economic reforms, allows various levels
of state authorities to lease land or enterprises to individuals, enabling them to develop and profit
from them outside the control of the state. 
4. According to an enquiry on 30 December 2015. Previous enquiries carried on CNKI and other Chi-
nese websites in 2013 and 2014 also reported large numbers of similar results, showing the im-
portance of these social issues.
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(nuoxi 傩戏) in the village of Shiyou. (5) It also makes use of the joint work
entitled The Last Chinese (6) by Chen Tong and Liu Chun (for the written
texts), directed by Jin Yongquan (mentioned above), who took the pho-
tographs. This collection of articles portrays Shiyou through a description
of its theatre and inhabitants, including Wu Boliang in particular. Although
based on its authors’ fieldwork in Shiyou in 2001, it is not actually a scien-
tific document but rather a travel narrative recording the experiences of
some young Chinese city-dwellers among the rural population. Its title, The
Last Chinese, seems to evoke James Fennimore Cooper’s historical novel,
The Last of the Mohicans, which dealt with the disappearance of the Native
Americans and created a sensation when it was published in 1826.
Abundant use is also made of Jin Yongquan’s newspaper article, subtitled
“How a peasant family was driven into bankruptcy.” This article played a
major role in the outcome, because its writer conducted further enquiries
on the spot, making it a trustworthy written basis for the main facts, and it
has been a helpful complement to data gathered by myself. Information on
Wu Boliang is also available on the internet. An article by Chinese legal ex-
perts gives an in-depth study of his case. (7)
The affair had repercussions, especially in Jiangxi Province, and of course
locally in the county of Nanfeng. For this reason, no new elements are in-
troduced in my article, which is concerned with giving an anthropological
interpretation of the facts. My aim is to throw light on some underlying but
important aspects that have been left out of the published material and
the websites. My objective is not the journalistic one of showing up the
faults or virtues of the protagonists, but rather the scientific one of trying
to understand the social relations at the heart of the affair.
I open with the local context, covering the geographical and the socio-
political situation of the village, Wu Boliang’s biography, and the major out-
lines of the legal process. Then there is a detailed account of each of the
different levels playing a role in the affair: the family, the village, the town-
ship, the county, the municipality, and in the end the capital, Beijing. After
that comes a study of the factors at the heart of the affair: money, the issues
of face and honour, and work. The article concludes with a summary of the
analysis developing the themes of the representation of the debt, the role
of the negotiation and bargaining, and the agents’ area of intervention in
contemporary Chinese society.
The village of Shiyou and the enquiry
Shiyou is located in Sanxi Township of Nanfeng County under the munic-
ipality of Fuzhou in Southeast Jiangxi, which is an agricultural province in
Southeast China. The village is about a dozen kilometres from the county
capital. The region is hilly with some medium-sized mountains, and used to
be mainly a producer of rice in the paddy fields of its valleys, in addition to
a few other secondary crops. Over the last 20 years or so it has seen the
widespread and intensive cultivation of mandarin oranges, which has
brought considerable prosperity to the inhabitants. In fact, the small sweet
mandarins were formerly cultivated in a few orchards, and used to be sent
as an annual offering to the imperial court. This tradition lives on because
every year the county still sends a certain amount of its best, carefully se-
lected mandarins directly to the centre. In the winter some of them can
also be bought in all the major Chinese cities under the name of “Nanfeng
mandarins.”
The village of Shiyou has about 1,300 inhabitants, the principal lineage of
which includes 75% of the populace surnamed Wu, with the remainder con-
sisting of several other family names. Formerly the village was run by lineal
dignitaries who formed a council based on kinship relations responsible for
organising the main village temple dedicated to the god of the nuo, and of
directing the annual ritual theatre. In 1949, these dignitaries were removed
from their administrative and political duties, retaining only their control
over the theatre, while the Communist Party took over running the village.
During the Cultural Revolution, the theatrical performances disappeared for
about 15 years and only reappeared in the late 1970s. The descendants of
the old dignitaries then recovered control over the theatre, but under the
leadership of the Party. The social relations between the villagers became
more complicated as the link with the Party was combined with the tradi-
tional kinship system. Nonetheless, the kinship relations are still very pre-
sent, as well as the ideology and the family practices that go with them.
These constitute a social bond that is both very strong (comprising a variety
of duties) and hierarchical (the distinction of fathers and dignitaries).
I first visited Shiyou in February 2002 to spend the New Year festival there
and to study its theatre. I was with two Chinese photographers, and we tele-
phoned Wu Boliang, who was the village head at the time and greeted us
warmly. Since then I have returned to the village nearly every year, at first for
the New Year festivities and later, over several years, for the summer months.
I was therefore able to observe the undercurrents of the affair throughout those
years, although many of the more intimate details were still unknown to me.
Wu Boliang’s biography
According to The Last Chinese:
Formerly Wu Boliang was one of the poorest peasants in Shiyou vil-
lage, to the point that his father considered arranging a “son-in-law
marriage” (8) for him. [...] Nowadays Wu Boliang is the richest man in
the village, and was the first to build a two-storey house there.(9)
The biographical details below were taken from Wu Boliang’s own words,
as well as from his autobiography and some information in The Last Chinese.
At the time of the first redistribution of land and household goods in the
1950s Wu B’s paternal grandfather received a bed and two rooms –but each
located in houses at some distance from one another. Wu Boliang’s father
was married in 1950, and he was born in 1952. He was the eldest child, with
four younger brothers and a sister. At eight years old he began to help his fa-
ther by taking the buffalos out to pasture, or making them turn the grindstone
or draw water from the well. At the age of ten he entered primary school,
where he studied for four years. But in his fifth year the Cultural Revolution
broke out, and Wu Boliang became a young Red Guard wearing a red armband
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5. Some of the results have been published in Catherine Capdeville-Zeng, Le théâtre dans l’espace
du people – une enquête de terrain en Chine (The theatre in the people’s space – an enquiry on
the ground in China), Paris, Les Indes Savantes, 2012.
6. Jin Yongquan, Chen Tong, and Liu Chun, Zuihou de hanzu (The Last Chinese), Beijing, Zhongyang
bianyi chubanshe, 2001.
7. Guo Bingqi and Liao Shenji, “Xi ‘min gao guan’ nan de yuanyin – cong zhidu cengmian jinxing
sikao” (Analysing the reasons for the difficulties faced by men of the people against the officials
– a reflexion on the system), The Journal of Fujian Institute of Political Science and Law, Vol. 23,
No. 1, March 2005, pp. 65-68.
8. A “son-in-law marriage” (or “uxorilocal marriage”) is one in which a man, who is usually poor,
goes to live with his father-in-law, instead of the wife coming to live with her husband’s family:
in such cases the name of the maternal grandfather is passed onto his grandsons by birth, and a
certain scorn is attached to those sons-in-law who are unable to pass on their family name to
their own sons.
9. Jin Yongquan, Chen Tong, and Liu Chun, Zuihou de hanzu (The Last Chinese), op. cit., p. 185.
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and going with his comrades to other people’s houses to “smash the four
olds” (po si jiu 破四旧). He told me that he now regrets these former activities,
but acknowledges that he understood nothing at the time and only followed
the movement. But his studies were over for him in any case, and he started
working the land with his father. He quickly obtained such good and copious
results that he won the respect of the other peasants. That allowed him to
become an agricultural technician, first for the village and then, in 1973, for
the township. In 1976, in order to avoid a “son-in-law marriage,” he married
his cousin, the daughter of his maternal uncle. He then joined a group of agri-
cultural technicians sent by Nanfeng County to Hainan Island to study the
technique of fertilising mandarin seeds. Returning home in 1977 after seven
months in Hainan, he was put in charge of seed fertilisation by the people’s
commune; this gave him an income of 24 yuan a month, which was a con-
siderable wage at the time, and better than the work points given for working
the land. His elder son was born in 1978 and a second one in 1980, after
which he adopted a daughter. In 1979 he built a new house for his numerous
family (which included his parents, his unmarried and married brothers with
their wives and children, and his own wife and children), which was the first
house in the village to be built of bricks and with more than one storey. 1981
saw the first partial “family division” (fenjia 分家), (10) which in terms of ac-
commodation amounted only to building separate kitchens for his married
brothers, while he remained the elder brother responsible for the family for-
tunes and especially for the education of his younger brothers.
With the decollectivisation of 1982, all the land was redistributed to the
peasants and a quota was allotted to every family member. Since Wu Bo-
liang’s family had many mouths to feed, their allocation amounted to
about ten mu, (11) which made it a large enterprise in local terms. After that
redistribution, the family underwent its second and final family division.
Wu Boliang gave up his position as the township agricultural technician to
“return home” (hui jia回家) and focus on his land and his crops. He quickly
began to earn more and more money. In 1983 he was among the first to
obtain a village orchard under the “responsibility system.” In 1985, man-
darin oranges fetched three mao (12) per half kilo, and he earned 1,000 yuan;
the following year they fetched six mao and he earned 3,000 yuan. In 1986
he signed a new responsibility contract with the township for a 50 mu or-
chard plus an 800 mu pine forest. In 1987 he took on a new village orchard,
followed by another one in 1991. The winter of 1991 was unusually cold,
and 85% of the mandarin trees in the county were frozen, but in 1990 Wu
Boliang had started to produce mandarin saplings, of which he had already
80,000 in hand to sell for 1.5 yuan each. This earned him 120,000 yuan in
1992, and he became the richest peasant in the village. That year he joined
the Party and built a new private house for himself with three storeys and
two wings. It was the tallest building in the village, where he could com-
fortably lodge his two sons when they got married.
In 1991 a national propaganda review published an article under the head-
ing: “He has enhanced the brilliance of Sanxi,” (13) which set out Wu’s agri-
cultural career since 1983 and ended with the following: 
The charming township of Sanxi raised up Wu Boliang. And in return
Wu Boliang has solidly developed and led activities that have given
Sanxi its mandarins, pigs, melons, and other fruits, bringing riches to
his impoverished village relatives. (14)
In 1994 he was put in charge of the township lands. In 1995, he was pro-
posed for election as “village secretary” (cun shuji 村书记) of Shiyou, but
only won the position of “assistant secretary” (cun fushuji 村副书记) and
“assistant village head” (fucunzhang 副村长). This position was ratified by
the village elections, and he kept it until 2005, when he was not re-elected.
In local terminology, these titles carry precedence in themselves, with “sec-
retary” taking first place and “village head” coming second, while the un-
flattering “assistant” usually remains unsaid, so Wu Boliang is generally
called the “village head,” taking second place behind the “village secretary.”
But it appears that he was really the political mover and shaker in village
affairs. It was during those years that he created and developed a pesticide
and fertiliser business, with one store in the village and another in the town-
ship capital, and then yet another in the county capital.
Between 1993 and 1997 he signed another responsibility contract with
the township for the development of two orchards. This was the contract
that would give rise to his difficulties.
From the contract to the legal proceedings
and their resolution
Not having any access to the responsibility contract signed by the two
parties, I have no knowledge of its precise terms. Wu Boliang informed me
that he was in charge of management and leadership, while the township’s
investment was the supply of land and finance. It is not clear how the two
parties shared the profits, or whether there were any profits. In fact, it takes
about five years for a tree to begin providing mandarins, and the contract
was not renewed after its five-year agreed term. The actual sums commit-
ted, and the interest accrued, remain opaque. Wu Boliang’s explanations on
that matter are still obscure to me.
Among the creditors, a distinction has to be made between the township
credit co-operative on the one hand, and the different informal lenders, in-
cluding three important tradesmen, on the other. The credit co-operative led
by the township was Wu Boliang’s primary creditor. After lending him some
funds, it then refused to grant him any further sums, although these were
necessary to develop the orchards. This lack of support by the credit co-op-
erative led Wu Boliang to seek other sources of credit, which explains the
growing number of creditors. When some of these private creditors called
on him to repay their loans in the late 1990s, and Wu Boliang was unable to
do so, he was himself forced to take legal action against the township.
On 29 February 2000, the Fuzhou municipal tribunal gave its verdict: Wu
Boliang won his case and the township was ordered to repay the sums he
had borrowed, in a single payment within eight days. 
This gave rise to a series of negotiations and back-and-forth between Wu
Boliang, the township, and the county. Using the justification that Sanxi is
a “poor township” that already had difficulties paying its officials and teach-
ers, the township refused to make a single repayment. It went on to make
irregular payments of several thousand, or tens of thousands of yuan,
stretched out over nineteen instalments and amounting to a total of about
300,000 yuan by 2010, which was not even half the amount claimed and
granted by the judgement. The problem for Wu Boliang was that with these
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10. Among the Chinese peasantry, the “family division” is the equal sharing between brothers of the
father’s possessions (land, buildings, tools etc.), allowing the sons to gain economic autonomy,
after which their households are independent of each other.
11. The mu is an area of arable land equivalent to 666.6 square metres.
12. Equivalent to a tenth of a yuan.
13. “Sanxi yin ta zeng se” (He has enhanced the brilliance of Sanxi), Laoqu jianshe, 6 June 1991.
14. Ibid., p. 47.
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small sums he could not repay his creditors on time. He was therefore
obliged to “roll over” the loans, and to “dismantle the eastern wall to repair
the western one” (as the aforementioned article on “the peasant family”
puts it). By 2010, the total amount he had to reimburse had risen to
880,000 yuan, payable to 27 creditors. The article states that: 
The loans generated exorbitant interest payment demands: the
70,000 yuan lent by the township cooperative in 1994 and 1995
alone created more than 260,000 yuan in interest by 2010. As for
the sums borrowed from private individuals at usurious rates, they
are so large that they are truly frightening. (15)
After 2000, in addition to his visits to the township and county govern-
ment offices, the Fuzhou municipal court, and lawyers’ offices, Wu Boliang
also went to the “offices for letters and visits” of  Nanfeng County, Fuzhou
Municipality, the provincial capital, Nanfeng, and then in the autumn of
2009, the national capital, Beijing. These “offices for letters and visits” (16)
are a peculiarly Chinese administrative institution, to which one can send
letters of complaint or go in person to complain about an injustice. The of-
fice then handles the matter by sending demands to the local authorities
to act in some way or another. By 7 June 2010, Wu Boliang had visited these
offices 94 times, and had been to various government offices to seek justice
on 240 occasions, without any tangible results. In September 2009, tired of
these judicial delays, Wu Boliang hired a lawyers’ office located in the mu-
nicipality to draw up a full account of all the overdue sums. They amounted
to over 600,000 yuan. Confronted by this figure, in early 2010 the township
indicated its willingness to reimburse the initial sum but not more than
50,000 yuan in interest. But then, according to the aforementioned article,
“the working group on implementing the court’s decision in favour of Wu
Boliang against Sanxi Township, Nanfeng County, acknowledged that in ad-
dition to the initial amount, it had to pay interest amounting to 300,000
yuan.” Nonetheless, this acknowledgement was not followed by any pay-
ment. On the contrary, again according to the same article, “On 10 June, a
township official admitted during an interview that the interest repayment
demanded by Wu Boliang was legal, but he asked the journalist to act as an
intermediary to advise Wu Boliang to ask for less.”
In desperation, Wu Boliang contacted Jin Yongquan in Beijing, who had di-
rected the joint publication, The Last Chinese. He came to spend several days
in Shiyou to conduct enquiries. Then his article appeared on 23 June 2010
in China Youth Daily. The next day, the article was immediately picked up on
several influential websites, and Nanfeng was subjected to great pressure.
The county head took charge of the affair to try to resolve the problem. It
seemed about to be settled, but the repayments were still not forthcoming. 
In 2011 and 2012 some sums were repaid, but Wu Boliang challenged the
amounts, considering them insufficient.
In 2013 the affair still dragged on, with a further 400,000 yuan still missing.
Finally, in 2014 the township signed a contract with Wu Boliang stipulating
that a new orchard would be assigned to him under a 50-year responsibility
contract, but after a lapse of three years (when the orchard would become
available, being currently ceded to another person). This new orchard would
be a reparation for all Wu Boliang’s losses, and the income from the sales
of its mandarins would allow him to reimburse his creditors. The affair was
finally resolved. Wu Boliang accepted this outcome, although he had to wait
until 2017 to take over the orchard and therefore had to keep his creditors
waiting.
The social relationships involved in the affair
Family relationships
The Wu Boliang affair was first and foremost a “family” matter in the
broadest sense.
In order to deal with the loss of support from the credit co-operative,
Wu Boliang borrowed at first, he told me, “from [his] brothers, [his] sisters,
[his] wife, [his] sister’s husband (brother-in-law), and from friends and
relatives” (including among the latter, some tradesmen). All of the people
mentioned in this list were outside the independent household estab-
lished by Wu Boliang through the family division. They included members
of the same generation, not only agnatic relations (his brothers) but also
relations on the female side: his wife’s sisters and their husbands. This
showed the strong mutual aid links between such people, which help to
resolve a relative’s financial problems. In the Chinese countryside – and
this is still the case nowadays in Shiyou – the members of a family are
tied by obligations to provide mutual aid according to the income of
each of them. Loans are only taken from those who are able to lend, and
the latter have a duty to lend in case of need. It is very difficult to get
out of these obligations, because each person’s income is more or less
well known to all. The family remains the main source of mutual aid as
it represents a reliable centre of relationships. The closer the relationship,
the more confidence one has. This way of seeing things is extended to
friends, and then to more distant relations. The Wu Boliang affair clearly
shows that the family replaces the failing co-operative structures – so it
is each person’s refuge against an arbitrary fate.
The family, or the nuclear family household, also represents the centre
of a network that branches out and extends to those on its outer periph-
ery, which means that there is no clear separation between an individual,
his family, and the rest of society. On the contrary, there is a continuous
relationship based on relative social distances. This relational indetermi-
nacy of the Chinese family, which has drawn the attention of certain
writers and especially the anthropologist Fei Xiaotong in his major work
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was made bankrupt), Zhongguo qingnian bao (China Youth Daily), 23 June 2010, p. 8.
16. These have been studied especially by Isabelle Thireau in Les ruses de la démocratie en Chine –
protester en Chine, (Democracy’s Ruses in China – How the Chinese Protest), Paris, Seuil, 2010.
There have been many studies in English, especially: Neil Diamant, Stanley Lubman, and Kevin
O’Brien (eds), Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possibilities for Justice, Redwood,
Stanford University Press, 2005; Philip Huang, Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice
in the Qing, Redwood, Stanford University Press, 1996; Carl Minzner, “Xinfang: An Alternative to
the Formal Judicial System,” Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, 2006, pp. 103-179.
Articles







village cun村 Shiyou 石邮
township xiang乡 Sanxi 三溪
county xian县 Nanfeng 南丰
municipality shi市 Fuzhou (Linchuan) 抚州(临川)
province sheng省 Jiangxi-Nanchang 江西－南昌
National capital shoudu首都 Beijing 北京
on rural China, is clearly seen in other spheres, especially in material pos-
sessions. (17)
For example, in March 2010, Wu Boliang went to see a lawyer to draw
up a certificate filing for bankruptcy. That certificate covered all the prop-
erty of his family enterprise: their land and trees, their own house, their
pesticide and fertiliser stores. In order to face his debts, he seriously con-
sidered selling all his goods – his own and those of his businesses. Similarly,
the authorities found it quite legitimate for Wu Boliang to use his proper-
ties and “personal” income to repay the township’s “public” debts. As a
pesticide salesman, Wu Boliang was considered to be “rich” by both the
villagers and the authorities, and the latter therefore found it “normal” for
him to use his other resources to pay back the debts from his orchards.
Whether from the viewpoint of the villagers or of the township and the
county, Wu Boliang as an individual and Wu Boliang as a family enterprise
were two entities who were not clearly distinguishable. And that is pre-
cisely the question that Wu Boliang himself had difficulty answering: to
what extent was he, as an individual and as a family man, responsible for
the township debts?
When he momentarily considered declaring himself bankrupt, he was
making himself (and his family enterprise) personally and completely re-
sponsible for the debts of the township. If he had followed through with
this action, it would have put him in contradiction with his struggle over
all those years to recover the money owed to him by the township – that
is to say, to get them to recognise Wu Boliang as a real, equal, and inde-
pendent partner, and not as a subordinate who could be manipulated at
will. For its part, the township administration, through its minor reimburse-
ments, partially acknowledged its own responsibility while also tying re-
sponsibility to Wu Boliang both as an individual and as a family and leaving
them to deal with the missing funds on their own. The Wu Boliang affair is
noteworthy for the difficulty experienced by its protagonists in clearly sep-
arating matters belonging to the “private” sphere, including that of the fam-
ily, from those belonging to the “public” domain and the state. On the one
hand, the township administration considered Wu Boliang to be a subordi-
nate member of the “township family” who could be treated as an inferior
subject to its decisions, and on the other hand Wu Boliang himself showed
that he shared this outlook when he did not hesitate to borrow in his own
name to settle a debt that was not his own – for instance, when he consid-
ered selling his personal belongings to settle the debts. The whole difficulty
of the affair lies in the inability of its main protagonists, the township on
one side and Wu Boliang on the other, to envisage a relationship between
themselves as autonomous beings. Social relations based on a familial and
hierarchical vision are still very present, and the affair shows that Fei Xiao-
tong’s observation in 1947 is still true today. Indeed, the lack of a clear dis-
tinction between the individual, the family, and the expanded local group
– in this instance, the township – is undoubtedly an important factor for
understanding how the protagonists could have ended up where they did –
that is to say, how Wu Boliang could have borrowed so much from his rel-
atives and friends, over and over again, to settle a debt that was not actually
his.
This difficulty in conceiving personal independence in relation to the fam-
ily, and in relation to the authorities, is also made clear in Jin Yongquan’s
article. It contains repeated examples where the term for “family,” jia, re-
places “peasant” or “person,” or where Wu Boliang’s name is added to it,
sometimes also designating his “real” family. In the course of translating for
this article, my difficulty in rendering the meaning of the term “family” re-
veals its dimensions, for in either French or English one would simply say “a
peasant,” or else one would name the individual to remove all imprecision.
It is obvious from the way the article is written that the boundary between
Wu B. the individual and his “family” is not clearly defined, and in the same
way, one never really knows who is a real member of this family, which
seems to include not only members of the nuclear family but also the whole
Wu lineage, along with relatives on the female side. This imprecision, beyond
the figurative style that it may represent, closely reflects the preponderance
of the family over the individual, a Chinese reality that has caused much
ink to flow. The interesting point is that in this respect, even nowadays after
the Communist revolution and modernisation, the family is still at the heart
of society in the countryside.
The village
The porous nature of the financial relations between relatives extends
from the family level to the village. The family’s capabilities are very limited,
hence the necessity of recourse to friends and relatives, and to more distant
acquaintances to whom kinship relations are extended. 
In his autobiography published in The Last Chinese Wu Boliang says
that during his village headship, “When there was not enough money in
the village coffers I lent it my own money.” (18) This phenomenon of fi-
nancial intertwining of individuals, families, neighbours, friends, and rel-
atives is the general case in rural society. When a peasant needs money
to invest in building a house, or sending his children to school or univer-
sity, his first choice is not to turn to a bank but to his relatives and friends
in the village. Borrowing from close relatives means avoiding interest
payments, but borrowing from friends or more distant acquaintances in
particular frequently involves “usurious rates.” Then why not borrow from
the bank? Perhaps because of what might happen in the event of non-
repayment: “Two days ago they took off to jail a man from our village
who could not pay back the 7,000 yuan that he owed to the co-opera-
tive.” (19) Another reason, pointed out in the article “Informal Lenders and
Rural Finance in China: A Report from the Field,” (20) is that the agricultural
bank and credit co-operatives often refuse loans to peasants whom they
consider insolvent, preferring to lend to local or even urban small enter-
prises; unlike these sources, the “informal lenders,” who represent a real
institution under different guises in the Chinese countryside, know the
peasants personally and have the means to get their loans back, if nec-
essary through the seizure of their crops, tools etc. So the informal
lenders make up for the insufficiencies of the financial organs of the
state, and the peasants are not put off by their high rates because, in ad-
dition to supplying their real needs, the basis of their relationship is per-
sonal acquaintance and trust.
So it turns out that in village life everyone is both lender and debtor to others,
on a small or larger scale. Credit is a way of life in itself, and it is the main social
relationship in the countryside because it is a form of exchange, and exchange
is at the basis of village life, as the Sino-American anthropologist Yan Yunxiang
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(1996) shows. (21) However, Yan Yunxiang does not tackle the credit aspect, and
he limits himself to describing the exchange of “gifts,” except when he happens
to mention the case of a gift being transformed into credit: 
When a certain villager had some financial problems, he turned to
one of his good friends for financial support. With a great deal of ef-
fort, the friend found a relative who would lend money to the first
villager to resolve his problem quickly. However, things turned bad
when the latter discovered that he would have to pay interest on
the loan. […] An interest-bearing loan is only applicable between
people who do not have good relations […]. (22)
In the 1990s, China began its remarkable economic take-off, and in the vil-
lages there was an increase in the number of financial exchanges. It is difficult
to invest without financial resources, as the example of Wu Boliang showed
when he needed money to meet the developmental needs of his orchards.
So, following a very common practice in the Chinese countryside, he turned
to his “relatives and friends” for a form of financial aid about which it is dif-
ficult to know whether it is in fact a gift (23) or a loan, it being understood
that both forms have to be repaid either with interest or by various other
means (mutual help, exchanges of skills or favours, etc.). There is no clear
distinction between the social relationship of mutual aid and the contractual
financial relationship, facilitating the recourse to loans that are considered
from the outset the kind of customary exchange of gifts deeply rooted in
the Chinese village rather than genuine contracts. This fluidity in exchanges
also depends on the specific situation of the countryside economy. In village
society there are no salaries. After the harvest, the village resounds with
money received by the peasants in one lump sum from mandarin orange
sales. The money must then be saved. As the cost of living is not very high
in the countryside, even though expenses pile up regularly, the earnings from
the mandarins can be considerable. If one person does not use up his money
straight away, others come to borrow from him, and that can be a good in-
vestment, especially since the lender puts them under an obligation.   
That is how Wu Boliang used his connections to borrow, which was for
him the only conceivable solution, given the failure of financial organisations
to support him. It is quite extraordinary that his creditors could finally reach
the grand total of twenty-seven. This figure indicates the breadth of his re-
lationship networks and their ramifications throughout the family, the vil-
lage, the township, and the county. 
In the township
What happened next? Why did the township government not reimburse
Wu? The current organisation of administration in China is part of the prob-
lem. From the top of the state government down to the lowest village level,
China has two complementary institutions: the Party and the civil govern-
ment. Although the members of the civil government are all Party members,
their government post always comes second to the corresponding position
in the Party. At the village, township, and county levels, the secretary of the
Party committee takes precedence over the governmental heads. Although
this administrative power stops at the township level, the Party is present ev-
erywhere in China, even down to the village level. Shiyou has about 20 Party
members who meet in a committee of village affairs, and the village leaders
are chosen from among their number. But the choice is made by the township
government (it nominates the Party secretary and approves the candidates
for village elections). The county government selects the township leaders,
and the municipality chooses the county leaders, and so on upwards. The gen-
eral rule is that leaders are chosen “from above” (shangmian 上面). 
There is, however, a clear cut-off point between villages and townships,
because villagers chosen to be heads of their village are generally unable to
become state functionaries by rising up through the higher levels. Their
peasant status means that village heads and secretaries usually cannot rise
within the hierarchy – or can only do so with difficulty. (24) By the same
token, the villages are ruled by their own village Party members and not by
cadres sent “from above,” whereas from the township level upwards the lo-
calities are administered by cadres appointed by the higher authorities, who
are not usually native to them. And China’s national policy is to rotate these
cadres regularly (usually every three years) to prevent them from forming
excessively close ties with those under their control. Consequently, as Wu
Boliang is quoted as observing in the article on his case, “Very often the
new officials do not acknowledge the steps taken under their predecessors,
and everything has to start again!” That is indeed where one of the problems
of the affair lies, obliging Wu on numerous occasions to meet with different
administrative teams. Exacerbating the problem of township officials’ non-
involvement in village affairs, the difference in status between a peasant
and officials from the higher township body, even if the former is a village
head and a Party member, makes him a second class citizen, which the
higher-level citizens do not fail to turn to their advantage.
The township officials who had been in charge of the responsibility con-
tract were moved elsewhere in the county, and it seems they never had to
answer personally for Wu Boliang’s case. However, from 2002 to 2003, the
newly appointed officials did undertake to resolve the affair by setting up
a “negotiated contract” with him, providing for the township government
to guarantee a yearly repayment of 50,000 yuan until the full repayment
of the debt, with the orchards as guarantee and collateral. But this solution
fell by the wayside for reasons that are still not clear (but it was partly taken
up again in 2014 and allowed the affair to ultimately be settled).
Nonetheless, it is quite clear that, for all its postponements, the township did
in effect repay part of the debt, and that it tried to resolve matters without suc-
cess. So it acknowledged its debt, but in the face of the enormous sums involved,
it showed itself unable to handle all the complex details. In fact, the township
was entirely reliant financially on the county as its superior authority.
From the township to the county
It is the county level that has administrative, political, and therefore fi-
nancial power. The townships are merely the basic cogs in the machine, and
they generally operate from a large village called the “township headquar-
ters” (xiangli 乡里 ), whereas the county administration is located in a
“county headquarters” (xiancheng 县城). All the local cadres from the dif-
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ferent administrations are assembled in one place, and the township cadres
often go there to get their orders, and spend most of their time there.
The county capital is also where the office of letters and visits is located.
This office does not open daily, and its hearings are announced publicly in
advance. Wu Boliang attended on numerous occasions, and the article on
his case opens with an account of his 94th visit:
[…] in order to be present at the reception day for the county leader
Zhu Honggen, which had been announced previously. [But] he was
disappointed because it was not the county chief who appeared on
that day. It was Rao Aihua, the secretary of the Sanxi township Party
committee, who was sent to receive the petitioners. (25)
It appears that this administration is controlled by the same leaders who run
the county: the petitioners whose demands have not been met by their leaders
turn to that office in the hope that it will find a solution, but in fact it is run by
the same people. Wu Boliang said with a sigh, “They are very polite in that of-
fice, but they do not solve the problems” (quoted in the same article on his
case). The government and administrations of the townships and the county
are their own little world: a few dozen cadres who roll on from post to post,
looking for chances of promotion to the county or the municipality. Currently
the county headquarters has only about a hundred thousand inhabitants, and
a walk down the high street is often an encounter with acquaintances. How-
ever, the county is itself dependent on its higher authority, the municipality,
which participates in the appointments of its secretary and county leaders.
From the municipality to the province, from the
province to Beijing… and back again to Nanfeng
How important is the municipality? Fuzhou, formerly called Linchuan, and
whose inhabitants still prefer to use its old name, is located about a hundred
kilometres north of Nanfeng, on the road to the provincial capital of Nan-
chang. It is a famous historical city, which enjoyed a certain notoriety under
the Song dynasty. But, being too distant from Nanfeng, this municipality
does not seem to have much influence on the county peasantry. For them,
Fuzhou is another world, where another language is spoken. So why did Wu
start his legal proceedings before the court in Fuzhou? The answer is: be-
cause the large sums at stake would be given more adequate attention by
a higher administrative level. And why did he hire a lawyer from Fuzhou?
Wu Boliang put more trust in the officials and lawyers from the “munici-
pality” of Fuzhou than in those from the “county” of Nanfeng. In the normal
run of things, the verdict of a municipal court, being at a higher level, should
have more authority over the officials of the lower county level. 
But Wu Boliang did not stop at the municipality. To put his demands be-
fore the office of letters and visits, he also went to Nanchang, the capital
of Jiangxi province, and then in 2009 to the national capital, Beijing. That
was because he had heard that a political decision by the central govern-
ment was ordering administrative bodies in the regions to deal with peti-
tioners’ problems, so he thought that he had a chance. The national office
of letters and visits received him, noted his demand, and sent the file back
to the county. That is to say, to the same people. But it seems that the
order from this office to repay the township’s debts to Wu Boliang did
have some effect, even though it was probably not decisive. 
This circular track shows the way in which Chinese society is “integrated”
and “hierarchized”: there is a direct vertical line from the village to the town-
ship, to the county, to the municipality, to the province, and finally to the
leadership of the state. But a local problem must be handled and resolved
at the local level, so the intervention by the Fuzhou court, by the lawyers,
and by the national office of letters and visits had limited effect because
the file always came back to the local officials. The legal system and the
office of letters and visits are not independent and have no power to ensure
that their verdicts are put into effect. According to the article on this affair:
“[And] even an official of the Fuzhou court told Wu Boliang privately that
difficulties in getting the judgements put into effect are a common phe-
nomenon, and that it was already quite an achievement for him to be re-
covering the initial amount.” Nonetheless, the verdict of the court and the
follow-up from the office of letters and visits were indispensable for Wu
Boliang, and over all those years he depended on them to get his rights re-
spected.
The heart of the affair: Money, face, honour,
and work
These are Wu Boliang’s own words in 2001, quoted in his autobiographical
statement in The Last Chinese:
I won my case before the intermediary court, but nobody believed
that the township was really going to pay me back; they said, “You,
Wu Boliang, have made the township lose face, so how can they give
you your money back?” Before the hearing, nobody thought I could
win. Deep down I was afraid, but I believed in justice. I said to the
creditors pursuing me, “Don’t be afraid, as soon as the township re-
imburses me, I will reimburse you.” The court judges came to make
enquiries on four occasions. Up until now the township had only paid
me back 6,000 yuan, and I myself put in 3,000. And do you know
how much they owed me? Over 400,000! I could not avoid paying
myself; even if I were to die, how could I be a man in my next rein-
carnation? And even for those 6,000 yuan, the judge said to me, you
absolutely must not tell outsiders because, he told me, the township
wanted to save face. I couldn’t tell anyone, but how could I explain
that to my creditors? (26)
An important element in the affair was indeed the protagonists’ need to
save face, (27) that of the institutions as well as the leaders. Such legal pro-
ceedings caused them to lose face, which was all the more reason for them
to be hostile to Wu Boliang for uncovering and displaying the affair in public.
But Wu Boliang himself also lost face, as he wrote in a letter to me in 2012.
This document throws light on how he still saw things 12 years after the trial:
Because I was first thrown forward and then thrown back caused me
a loss of over 5 million yuan, including the cost for the proceedings,
the hotel visits, the food and other expenses amounting to over
300,000 yuan, the sums borrowed from private individuals at incre-
mental rates whose interest for those 12 years amounted to more
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than 1.5 million yuan; the losses from my investments in the or-
chards reached more than 1.5 million, while the losses from my pes-
ticide business were again more than 1.5 million. In addition, the
whole business ruined my health and cost me a great deal; in
medicines alone, the amount was more than 300,000 yuan over
those 12 years. Now I am completely unable to work and cannot
meet my own needs. It has all caused me a lot of psychological suf-
fering. Whereas formerly I received the title of “pioneer in science
and technology in aid of the poor,” I have now been driven into
bankruptcy, my life is a failure, I no longer have the energy to develop
my orchards and agricultural technology, my health is ruined, and
my family enterprise has been halted in its tracks. The saddest thing
is that I cannot pay off all my debts on time and my word is no longer
accepted, so I have lost my honour and no longer have face in the
sight of others.
Wu Boliang begins this narration by adding up all the sums involved. They
come to around 5 million yuan, which is much more than the amounts men-
tioned earlier. Now his accountancy mixes together the loans and their in-
terest, the amounts spent on the legal proceedings and the visits to the office
of letters and visits, the loss of potential investment in his orchards and
stores, and his expenditure on his health. The overall damages cover the eco-
nomic outcomes (the arrested development of Wu Boliang’s business), the
medical consequences (the deterioration of his health), and the psychological
result (his incalculable suffering). But the worst thing, with which Wu Boliang
concludes his list of downfalls, is his loss of honour and face.
In the end, the failure to reimburse not only led to financial insolvency
but brought about social effects on the life and honour of the individual. In
losing face, the individual falls apart, he no longer has honour, people no
longer speak to him and he no longer dares to speak to others, so he be-
comes a kind of outcast. Jin Yongquan tells us in his article, “When we walk
in the village, Wu Boliang avoids meeting the villagers, and those whom he
knows very well no longer come to speak to him.”
He was no longer the richest and most respected peasant in the village,
he was no longer the technician respected for his agricultural knowledge,
and he was no longer the village head recognised by the township author-
ities for his “ability to think clearly about things.” (28) He had become a pe-
titioner, that is to say, a kind of beggar who uses rather dishonourable means
to get his money back.
In this respect, the sums of money involved represent more than simple
quantities; they are above all the measure of the individual’s social status.
In Chinese society under the economic reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping
in the early 1980s with the slogan “enrich yourselves!”, social status, which
had previously been based in general on “class status” (jieji chengfen 阶级
成分), (29) came to be grounded exclusively on the capacity to get rich. Wu
Boliang was respected because he quickly grew rich and rose above his sta-
tus as a peasant to join the class of tradesmen. But his legal proceedings
caused him to lose the most important aspect of status, which cannot be
calculated in monetary quantities but rather in the quality of social respect.
So it was not only a sum of money that he lost in the proceedings, the
money being only the visible part of the iceberg, but above all the dearly
won element of face that also represents a value, and he became a contro-
versial figure.
Finally, in 2013, it seems that he recovered some of his energy; he com-
plained less, some money had been returned to him, his health improved a
little, and he built a new house in the village for his pesticide and fertiliser
store. And then I was told, “There was never a Wu Boliang affair; it was just
a communication problem.” But it was necessary to wait for 2014 to reach
the final solution and bring the affair to a definite end, with the signing of
a contract between Wu Boliang and the township.
An analytical overview
The affair brought up two salient points in the problem of how debt is
understood: the role of negotiation and bargaining, and the ability of the
agents involved to take action to influence political decisions of the higher
levels.
In his introduction to the collective work Lien de vie, nœud mortel – les
représentations de la dette en Chine, au Japon et dans le monde indien
(The ties of life, a deadly knot – representations of debt in China, Japan,
and the Indian world), Charles Malamoud states that for the societies being
considered in that volume “[…] debt organises social life, and therefore the
life of man himself as a social animal: its presence in the world creates a
network of ties that imprison him while simultaneously supporting him
[…] it is the weave of life itself […]” (30). In the contemporary Chinese village
of Shiyou, unlike the pre-reform period of Communist rule, when property
and the means of production were held in common, indebtedness towards
relatives and friends has again become a constant factor of social life.
Today it is once again the case, as Michel Cartier notes in his article in the
above volume, “Debt and Property in China,” that “usury raises no ideolog-
ical objections,” (31) unlike in Judeo-Christian and Islamic cultures. Moreover,
according to Viviane Alleton’s article in the same volume, there would ap-
pear to be no link in the Chinese language between moral debt and mate-
rial debt. (32) My study of the Wu Boliang affair also shows that the
settlement of a debt is not a “moral” issue of good or bad but rather a mat-
ter of social relations based on the status of the protagonists. The demand
that face be respected, discussed in the previous section, means a respect
for Wu Boliang as an individual and likewise for the institution of the town-
ship government, but it has no bearing on their moral character. The con-
cept of face rests on the social norm that requires repayment, not because
repayment is “good” but because it perpetuates and renews social relations,
whereas “non-repayment” amounts to their arrest, a check on this circu-
lation, which on the social level is responsible for a loss of face. Face is the
wellspring of honour, and even of life itself, as Wu Boliang says at the end
of his letter: 
Give me justice and fair treatment! Give me back my life! Give me
back my honour!
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For Wu Boliang, the non-repayment of the debt by the authorities had
the effect of depriving him of his place in society, which he had patiently
built with a great deal of effort and energy, in order to rise to the top of his
local society. And he should not have been prevented from developing and
rising even further. Wu Boliang complains that the development of his fam-
ily enterprise was blocked, and he told me on several occasions that if not
for the trial, he would have continued on his path to becoming a millionaire
and would by now be a large property owner. What his complaint raises is
not a moral issue; on the contrary, he gives a very concrete list of the fi-
nancial effects of the debt upon him as well as their direct social conse-
quences. His loss of face was a loss of social status, which cast him down
from his eminent position, and in that downfall the “moral” question was
secondary.
Neither is there any conflict between “good” and “bad” in the Wu Boliang
affair. Not all the cadres were bad, and some of them did their best to
move the case file forward. The final responsibility rests with the system,
which organises a chain of social relations whose nerve centres had to be
jolted into action to finally get the reimbursements paid. Basically, Wu
Boliang and the authorities were completely detached from any sense of
moral responsibility towards their creditors, whom they simply kept wait-
ing, because in present-day China, just as in former times, one’s status as
“master of the money” (33) both arises from and is located in the occupa-
tion of a superior social position. That makes it possible to manipulate
anyone in the lower, subordinate position who might be called a “servant
of money.” As is shown by the Chinese verb jie借, which means either “to
lend” or “to borrow” according to the context alone, the outward and in-
ward flows of money are of the same order, but the real difference is de-
termined by the social status of the protagonists who are linked
hierarchically in a chain of interdependences. Given this situation, it be-
comes very difficult to step outside the chain, since each level tries to act
over the others, as the township seeks funds from the county, which in
turn seeks them from the municipality, and the latter from the province,
which turns to the state. Each level is only a stage in which the higher
levels have the power and capacity to impose their own temporary prior-
ities, whereas the lowest level at the bottom can only have recourse to
patience (or disappearance, in extreme cases). For similar reasons, Wu Bo-
liang undertook the legal proceedings not so much through personal
courage but because he had been pushed to that extreme; it was because
some of his creditors were thinking of taking legal action against him that
he was cornered into making his accusation against the township govern-
ment. Finally the triggering mechanism was perhaps a conflict between
people within the credit co-operative and the township government, two
bodies normally considered to be associated, and Wu Boliang may have
been a pawn in the affair because of his intermediate position between
them.
Another essential element is the nature of the bargaining throughout the
affair, and the importance of negotiation, and of waiting. Clearly, the
lawyers’ offices had precise records of the sums owed to Wu Boliang, and
the court also conducted its enquiry before pronouncing its verdict. But
that did not prevent an official from telling Wu Boliang that he ought to
“ask for less.” Although that was partly owing to the huge build-up in the
interest, it would still be interesting to analyse this bargaining conducted
through lengthy negotiations. The authorities bargained, twisted around,
and stretched out the affair, while Wu Boliang ran around in search of sup-
port, but he too bargained, twisted around, and stretched out the affair in
the face of his creditors. They all shared the same attitude and behaviour,
making the ultimate creditors wait. China was developing, however, and in-
flation was rising along with rates of interest on borrowing.
Lastly, Wu Boliang and the township government differed in the way in
which they assumed responsibility for the affair. Whereas Wu Boliang con-
templated the possibility of bankruptcy, which would have had conse-
quences stretching even into his next reincarnation when he could not “be
a man,” (34) for many years the authorities showed little concern for the con-
sequences for Wu Boliang. Their higher position in the hierarchy meant that
they did not rely on any moral or social authority to govern, but only on
their administrative apparatus, their mastery over time, and their authori-
tarian power, against which individuals, families, and private groups have
few resources to support them.
However, the social spaces for such resources do exist. One example is
the office of letters and visits. As Isabelle Thireau emphasises in her article
on this institution cited above:
The writers of these testimonies expect the local authorities to pro-
vide public services and just institutions – that is, institutions that
would stop recognising only the special advantages, privileges, and
exorbitant power of some (not just in writing but in actual practice).
Admittedly, these expectations do not affect the actual political
forms of the regime or the contents of its laws and the measures to
implement them, but they are nonetheless political, and they par-
ticipate in the constantly renewed struggle for democracy. (35)
Without the verdict of the court, and the support from the office of letters
and visits, Wu Boliang’s appeals to the township and county governments
would have lacked legitimacy. But these institutions do not carry sufficient
weight in themselves to get their decisions carried out. Hence the impor-
tance of the third agency finally mobilised by Wu Boliang: the media. The
article published in a recognised national daily in 2010 was an effective
lever in the whole affair.
Nonetheless it took another four years to reach a complete resolution.
Perhaps the political anti-corruption movement implemented in China in
2013 may have put strong pressure on the local authorities to take initiative
in resolving the cases in their constituencies. 
Conclusion
This case of an individual in a single loan affair shows the weight of the in-
stitutions and the relative position of the protagonists facing them. But here
again, the weight of the ideology of the family and the hierarchy, which cov-
ers all social relations, still imprisons both villagers and cadres in the net
of services and status, and it structures their relationship to debt. The in-
dividuals are cogs in the institutional machine, and in the last resort they
are only distinguished from each other by the amount of face they have
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managed to accumulate or, on the other hand, by the dishonour they
have not managed to avoid. But in both cases this shapes their relative
status, which rebounds not only on their own persons but above all on
the groups to which they belong, namely the family, the village, and the
higher administrations. The chain of interdependencies is still very active
today; it is very difficult to change it, its constant manipulation by the
agents only makes it stronger, with the result that autonomy is not one
of this society’s confirmed values. Nevertheless, the presence of agents
actively working for justice, whether they are the court, the office of let-
ters and visits, or the media, mean that in modern China even peasants
with their lower status can aspire to fulfil their dreams; and by the same
token, when they come up against established power, either by chance or
in their struggle against adversity, there are agencies in place to offer them
a basis of support. This support is indispensable but is often insufficient,
at least in the short or medium term, as is shown by this study of a case
resolved 14 years later.
Looking back at the example of Wu Boliang as an individual, we have to
recognise that a major role was played by his intelligence, his courage, his
tenacity, and his ability to mobilise his social relations. Despite the difficul-
ties he had to confront, he never expressed any despair or dissidence, even
if he directly attributed his ill health to the affair. He always continued to
search for resolutions within his own social context. Jin Yongquan’s article
on his case ends by recalling his words: “I believe – still – in the law; I still
believe in the government!” Wu Boliang is a man “of that world,” and in the
teeth of all adversity he maintained his respect for the law and its authority.
The protracted nature of his struggle did not prevent him from retaining
his hope in the face of the present social conditions in China. His attach-
ment to his native village, and his continuing concern for it, also show that
he always remained a man of his land, perhaps in the full meaning of the
term: “the last of the Chinese.”
z Translated by Jonathan Hall.
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